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Abstract
Rational bubbles are believed to be fragile and unable to explain the trad-
ing frenzy associated to price run-ups. With limited enforcement of credit
contracts and endogenous debt limits designed to prevent default and allow
for maximal credit expansion, a large class of bubbles can be introduced in
asset prices by appropriately tightening agents’ debt limits. By not affect-
ing consumption, these bubbles are ideally suited to explain a variety of asset
pricing puzzles. They can generate large increases in trade volume until they
crash. Nonpositivity of debt limits restricts the potential for bubble injections
to assets in zero supply or to equilibria with an infinite present value of ag-
gregate endowment. Such equilibria are common in economies with limited
enforcement, where interest rates are low to induce debt repayment (Bidian
and Bejan 2012).
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1 Introduction
A bubble is defined as the price of an asset in excess of the discounted present value of
its dividends. While developing (collapsing) price bubbles are a favorite explanation
for stock market run-ups (crashes), their existence in standard stochastic dynamic
general equilibrium models is possible only under special conditions. Santos and
Woodford (1997) showed that bubbles can be ruled out on assets in positive supply,
when the present value of aggregate consumption is finite.1 This is always the case
if, for example, there is at least an asset that grows at a (long-run) rate greater or
equal to the growth rate of aggregate consumption. The outline of their argument
is that an optimizing agent exhausts his financial wealth and does not allow it to
exceed the present value of his future consumption. Thus the aggregate financial
wealth becomes arbitrarily small in present value terms, which is incompatible with
the existence of a bubble on an asset in positive supply. For deterministic economies,
the results of Santos and Woodford (1997) were anticipated by Kocherlakota (1992)
and later refined by Huang and Werner (2000).2
In apparent contradiction with the nonexistence of bubbles results, there ex-
ists a well developed literature on speculative bubbles in economies with short sale
constraints and asymmetric information (Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite 1993) or
heterogenous beliefs (Scheinkman and Xiong 2003, Slawski 2008). Such bubbles are
possible even with a finite time horizon. Moreover, as emphasized by Scheinkman
1 They prove that there exists a discount factor (pricing kernel) compatible with the absence of
arbitrage opportunities such that the fundamental value of the asset computed under this discount
factor equals its price. Moreover, if the agents are sufficiently impatient, in the sense that they
are always willing to give up a fixed fraction of all future consumption in exchange for the current
aggregate endowment, then the price of an asset in positive supply is always equal to its fundamental
value, irrespective of the choice of a discount factor compatible with the absence of arbitrage.
2Montrucchio and Privileggi (2001) also show that under mild assumptions on agent’s prefer-
ences, bubbles cannot exist in a representative agent economy. The absence of bubbles follows even
without assuming the existence of a sufficiently productive asset.
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and Xiong (2003, 2004), speculative bubbles can generate large volumes of trade,
which is a typical feature of bubble episodes (Cochrane 2002) and which, according
to them, cannot be explained by rational bubbles (bubbles arising without differen-
tial information). Crucially, these papers use a different definition of bubbles, which
takes as the fundamental value of an asset, following Harrison and Kreps (1978) and
Morris (1996), the amount that an agent would be willing to pay if he were forced
to maintain the holdings of the asset forever. Such a valuation ignores the “con-
venience yield” accruing to an agent holding an asset and thus underestimates the
fundamental value.3
Bidian (2011, Chapter 2) shows that once a unified definition of bubbles is used,
speculative bubble also cease to exist under the same conditions under which rational
bubbles fail to exist, despite the presence of differential information and short sale
constraints. Fundamental values are computed using, whenever possible, discount
factors that satisfy the fundamental theorem of asset pricing, that is the asset prices
are equal to the expected discounted value of next period dividends and resale price
of the assets.
In this paper, we show that rational bubbles are a robust and intrinsic feature
of economies where restrictions on debt arise endogenously from enforcement limita-
tions. Agents have the option to default on debt and receive a continuation utility
that can be date and state dependent. As in Alvarez and Jermann (2000), we as-
sume that the markets select the largest debt limits so that repayment is always
individually rational given future bounds on debt. Rational bubbles enable agents
to circumvent tight debt limits and achieve identical allocations to those possible
under more relaxed, but still self-enforcing debt limits. Thus, one interpretation of
the type of bubbles we construct here is that they develop as a way to correct credit
crunches.
We build on the insight of Kocherlakota (2008), who showed that arbitrary bub-
3Indeed, with shorting restrictions, an agent keeping inventories of an asset has the option to sell
it if its price is high and can better smooth demand shocks, and therefore enjoys a convenience yield
(Cochrane 2002). Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002) rationalize the convenience yield induced
by short sale constraints as the value of lending fees arising from searching for security lenders and
bargaining over the terms of lending.
3
bles can be injected in asset prices, while leaving agents’ consumption unchanged, as
long as the debt constraints of the agents are allowed to be adjusted upwards by their
initial endowment of the assets multiplied with the bubble term. The introduction
of a bubble gives consumers a windfall proportional to their initial holding of the
asset, which can be sterilized, leaving their budgets unaffected, by an appropriate
tightening of the debt limits. Kocherlakota (2008) refers to this result as “the bubble
equivalence theorem”. The modified debt constraints bind in exactly the same dates
and states, and they are again the endogenous bounds allowing for maximal credit
expansion and preventing default.
A major limitation of Kocherlakota’s (2008) results is the assumption that agents
can trade in a full set of state-contingent claims to consumption next period, in
addition to the existing long-lived securities. Hence one might infer that bubble
injections are associated to knife-edge situations, and they might not apply even to
economies with dynamically complete markets (rather than Arrow-Debreu complete).
Moreover, a bubble injection influences only agents’ holdings of Arrow securities,
leaving untouched their portfolios of long-lived securities. Therefore his result cannot
justify the trade volume increases associated with the presence of bubbles.
We prove that the bubble equivalence theorem holds even when markets are
incomplete. Incomplete markets models with limited enforcement warrant study
since they can better reflect the limited extent of risk-sharing in the data (A´braha´m
and Ca´rceles-Poveda 2010). We show that any positive process that does not distort
the set of pricing kernels can be injected in the asset prices as a bubble. Gain
processes associated to a large class of trading strategies satisfy this condition. We
also allow for more general punishments after default than in Kocherlakota (2008).
In particular, we cover the case where upon default the agents are forbidden to carry
debt (Bulow and Rogoff 1989, Hellwig and Lorenzoni 2009). For this outside option,
the agents’ continuation utilities after default depend on asset prices, since lending
is still allowed.
It should be emphasized that there is no contradiction between the bubble equiva-
lence theorem presented here and the nonexistence of bubbles results. The latter rely
on the hidden assumption that the debt limits faced by agents are nonpositive, while
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the adjusted debt bounds after a bubble injection must become positive eventually,
if the asset is in positive supply and the present value of aggregate consumption is
finite (interest rates are high), even though this may happen with arbitrarily small
probability. However, low interest rates are the natural result of the existence of
enforcement limitations, since in equilibrium the interest rates adjust to a lower level
to entice agents to repay their debt and prevent default. In fact, when the default
punishment is the interdiction to borrow and markets are complete, Hellwig and
Lorenzoni (2009) show that the discounted (that is, multiplied by the pricing kernel)
debt limits are martingales, and that the present value of aggregate consumption
must be infinite.4 With complete markets, Bidian and Bejan (2012) show that bub-
ble injections leading to nonpositive debt limits are possible for much more general
penalties for default. In particular, bubbles can be sustained in equilibrium also
under a permanent interdiction to trade, or just a temporary interdiction to trade.
We show through examples that bubble injections can generate large increases
in the volume of trade. First, we analyze the complete markets example studied in
Alvarez and Jermann (2001) and Kehoe and Levine (2001), in which agents are not
allowed to trade after default. We substitute the one-period Arrow securities used by
them with infinitely lived assets that dynamically complete the markets. We focus
on two types of dividend structures and on deterministic and stochastic bubbles, and
show that a bubble injection in one of the assets can induce a volume of trade increase
in all assets, thus causing a large market-wide increase in trade volume. The increase
is persistent, even when the bubble lasts arbitrarily long. When the bubble crashes,
the volume of trade collapses when compared to the volume levels in the absence of a
bubble, and then reverts back to normal. Second, we consider an incomplete markets
economy having a Pareto optimal equilibrium. As in Judd, Kubler, and Schmedders
(2003), there is no trade after an initial portfolio rebalancing by the agents. A bubble
injection generates persistent market-wide increases in the volume of trade.
Bubble injections distort prices (and returns) and can increase their volatility,
without affecting consumption (fundamentals). Therefore they are ideally suited to
explain the “excess volatility puzzle” - the large volatility of asset prices, with very
4A bubble discounted by the pricing kernel is always a nonnegative martingale.
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little movements in dividends or consumption (Shiller 1981, LeRoy and Porter 1981).
We show that introducing a bubble in an asset increases the conditional expected
return, respectively conditional Sharpe ratio of the asset if the rate of growth of
the bubble covaries, respectively is correlated more negatively to fundamentals (the
stochastic discount factor) than the initial asset return. Thus bubbles can help ex-
plaining the “equity premium puzzle” (Cochrane 2000, Chapter 21). The variability
of Sharpe ratios over time without an accompanying variability of the volatility of
consumption (the “conditional equity premium puzzle”) would also be an immediate
consequence of a bubble injection (Cochrane 2000, Chapter 21).
Rational bubbles do not have to be nonstationary, as commonly believed, and
therefore at odds with empirical observations. With low interest rates, bubbles can
grow at the rate of aggregate endowment and be stationary. Such examples are
constructed in Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) and Bidian and Bejan (2012). Bidian
(2011, Chapter 5) gives an example of a (strictly) stationary bubble for economies
with an arbitrary pricing kernel. As explained there, such bubbles are virtually
undetectable by standard stationarity tests.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the bubble
equivalence theorem. Section 3 analyzes the implications of bubble injections on
volume of trade and asset returns, and Section 4 concludes. Appendix A gives
necessary and sufficient conditions on a process which, if added to asset prices, will
not distort the pricing kernels (and the one-period asset spans). Appendix B shows
that gain processes associated to a large class of strategies satisfy those conditions.
2 Bubble injections
We consider a stochastic, discrete-time, infinite horizon economy. The time periods
are indexed by the set N := {0, 1, . . .}. The uncertainty is described by a probability
space (Ω,F , P ) and by the filtration (Ft)∞t=0, which is an increasing sequence of
σ-algebras on the set of states of the world Ω, generating F , that is such that
F = σ(∪tFt). We interpret Ft as the information available at period t. We assume
that F0 = {∅,Ω} and that Ft is a finite σ-algebra, for all t. For ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ N,
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the set of states that are known to be possible at t if the true state is ω is Ft(ω) :=
∩{A ∈ Ft | ω ∈ A}.5
A sequence x = (xt)t∈N of random variables (F -measurable real-valued functions)
is a stochastic process adapted to (Ft)∞t=0 (“process” henceforth) if for each t ∈ N,
xt is Ft-measurable. We let X be the set of all stochastic processes, and denote
by X+ (respectively X++) the processes x ∈ X such that xt ≥ 0 P -almost surely
(respectively xt > 0 P -almost surely) for all t ∈ N. All statements, equalities, and
inequalities involving random variables are assumed to hold only “P -almost surely”,
and we will omit adding this qualifier. When K,L ∈ N \ {0}, let XK×L be the set of
vector (or matrix) processes (xij)1≤i≤K,1≤j≤L with xij ∈ X. For x ∈ XK×L, we write
x ≥ 0 (respectively x > 0, x = 0) if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ K, 1 ≤ j ≤ L and t ∈ N, xijt ≥ 0
(respectively xijt > 0, x
ij
t = 0).
6 The set of nonnegative processes x ∈ XK×L (that is,
such that x ≥ 0) is denoted by XK×L+ .
There is a single consumption good and a finite number, I, of consumers. An
agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I} has endowments ei ∈ X+, and his preferences are represented
by a utility U : X+ → R given by U i(c) = E
∑∞
t=0 u
i
t(ct), where u
i
t : R+ → R is
continuous, increasing and concave and E(·) is the expectation operator with respect
to probability P . The conditional expectation given the information available at t,
Ft, is denoted by Et(·). Since there is no information at period 0, E0(·) = E(·).
The continuation utility of agent i at t provided by a consumption stream c ∈ X+ is
U it (c) := Et
∑
s≥t u
i
s(cs).
There is a finite number J of infinitely lived, disposable securities, traded at
every date. The dividend and price vector processes are d = (d1, . . . , dJ) ∈ X1×J+
and p = (p1, . . . , pJ) ∈ X1×J++ .
Consumer i has an initial endowment θi−1 ∈ RJ+ of securities and his trading
strategy is represented by a process θi ∈ XJ×1. Fix some wealth bounds wi ∈ X
for agent i and define the budget constraint and indirect utility of an agent i from
5Using the usual “event tree” terminology, Ft(ω) is the date t node containing state (“leaf”) ω
(for the parallel between the stochastic processes and event tree language, see Leroy and Werner
2001, chapter 21).
6We write x 6= 0 if there exists t, i, j such that xi,jt = 0 does not hold (that is, xi,jt differs from
zero on a set of positive probability). Similarly x 	 0 means that x ≥ 0 but x 6= 0.
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period s ≥ 0 onward, when faced with prices p ∈ X1×J+ , debt bounds wi ∈ X and
having an initial wealth νs : Ω→ R which is Fs-measurable, as
Bis(νs, w
i, p) = {(ci, θi) ∈ X+ ×XJ×1 | cis + psθis ≤ eis + νs, (2.1)
cit + ptθ
i
t ≤ eit + (pt + dt)θit−1, (pt + dt)θit−1 ≥ wit,∀t > s},
V is (νs, w, p) = max
(ci,θi)∈Bis(νs,wi,p)
U is(c
i). (2.2)
Definition 2.1. A vector
(
p¯, (w¯i)Ii=1, (c¯
i)Ii=1, (θ¯
i)Ii=1
)
consisting of a security price
process p¯ ∈ X1×J+ , and for each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, debt limits w¯i ∈ X, a con-
sumption process c¯i ∈ X+ and a trading strategy θ¯i ∈ XJ×1 is an equilibrium with
exogenous debt limits if the following conditions are met:7
i. The consumption and trading strategies of each agent i are feasible and optimal,
that is (c¯i, θ¯i) ∈ B0((p¯0 + d0)θi−1, w¯i, p¯) and U i(c¯i) = V i0
(
(p¯0 + d0)θ
i
−1, w¯
i, p¯, d
)
.
ii. Markets clear:
∑I
i=1 c¯
i
t =
∑I
i=1 e
i
t+dt·
∑I
i=1 θ
i
−1,
∑I
i=1 θ
i
t =
∑I
i=1 θ
i
−1, ∀t ∈ N.
Consider an equilibrium
(
p, (wi)Ii=1, (c
i)Ii=1, (θ
i)Ii=1
)
with exogenous debt bounds.
Since the utilities of the agents are strictly increasing in consumption at each date
and state, prices p exclude arbitrage opportunities. Thus there cannot exist θ ∈ XJ×1
and t ∈ N such that ptθt ≤ 0 and (pt+1 + dt+1)θt ≥ 0, with at least one inequality
being strict on a set of positive probability. Otherwise consumer i would alter his
portfolio θit at t by adding to it the strategy θt, guaranteeing an increase in his
consumption at t and t+ 1, and a strict increase in one of the periods, with positive
probability. This modified strategy still satisfies the debt constraints. The absence
of arbitrage opportunities is equivalent to the existence of a process a ∈ X++ such
that (Leroy and Werner 2001)
atpt = Et [at+1(pt+1 + dt+1)] , ∀t ≥ 0. (2.3)
We denote by A(p) the set of all processes a ∈ X satisfying equation (2.3), and we
7Although debt limits are exogenous up to this point, we include them in the equilibrium outcome
for ease of exposition.
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call them deflators. Strictly positive deflators belonging to A++(p) := A(p) ∩ X++
will be called state price densities, or (interchangeably) pricing kernels. Equation
(2.3) implies that pt =
1
at
Et
∑
s>t asds + limT→∞
1
at
EtaTpT , and
bt(a, p) :=
1
at
lim
T→∞
EtaTpT (2.4)
is well defined and nonnegative, and for all t ∈ N, atbt(a, p) = Etat+1bt+1(a, p).
Therefore a · b(a, p) is a nonnegative martingale, and b(a, p) = 0 if and only if
b0(a, p) =
1
a0
limt→∞Eatpt = 0. We interpret the discounted present value of div-
idends d under under the state price density a, that is ft(a) :=
1
at
Et
∑
s>t asds, as
the fundamental value of d. Hence b(a, p) represents the part of asset prices in ex-
cess of fundamental values. Following Santos and Woodford (1997), we say that the
equilibrium price process p ambiguously involves a bubble if b0(a, p) > 0 for some
a ∈ A++(p), while b0(a′, p) = 0 for some other a′ ∈ A++(p). If b0(a, p) > 0 for all
a ∈ A++(p), the equilibrium prices unambiguously involves a bubble component.
Kocherlakota (2008) assumed that in addition to trading in long-lived securities,
agents can also trade in each period a full set of state-contingent claims to consump-
tion next period. Given an equilibrium without bubbles in which the asset prices are
p and the state price density8 is a, and given an arbitrary process ε ∈ X1×J+ such that
a · ε is a martingale, he showed that an “equivalent” equilibrium with prices p + ε,
pricing kernel a and identical consumption paths for the agents can be constructed.
Moreover, in the new equilibrium, the debt constraints bind in exactly the same
dates and states as in the original equilibrium. He dubbed this result the “bubble
equivalence theorem”, since the process ε “injected” in the asset prices is the bubble
component for the price process p+ ε, that is ε = b(a, p+ ε).
We show that Kocherlakota’s (2008) bubble equivalence theorem holds in our
incomplete markets framework, if the candidate processes to be injected in asset
8The pricing kernel is unique when markets are complete .
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prices are nonnegative processes in the set of span-preserving martingales
MJ(p) :=
{
ε ∈ X1×J | ∃Λ ∈ XJ×J s.t. ∀t ≥ 0, εt = ptΛt,
εt+1 = (pt+1 + dt+1)Λt, and det(I + Λt) 6= 0} , (2.5)
where I denotes the J-dimensional identity matrix, and det(·) is the determinant
of a matrix. Let MJ+(p) := M
J(p) ∩ X1×J+ . The chosen terminology is justified in
Appendix A, Proposition A.2, where it is shown that a process ε belongs to MJ(p)
if and only if the set of deflators associated to prices p and p + ε coincide, that
is A(p) = A(p + ε), or equivalently, if and only if p and p + ε generate the same
one-period asset spans and a · ε is a martingale for any deflator a ∈ A(p). Two
equilibria with prices p and p+ ε cannot be equivalent unless ε ∈MJ+(p), otherwise
the set of pricing kernels would differ, A(p) 6= A(p + ε). We will show in fact that
any ε ∈ MJ+(p) can be injected as a bubble in prices and leading to an equivalent
equilibrium. The question whether the set MJ+(p) is nonempty is legitimate. In
Appendix B, Proposition B.1, we give sufficient conditions under which the (vector)
gain process of J trading strategies belongs to MJ+(p). In particular, we show that the
gain process associated with a buy-and-hold portfolio of the shares of the J assets
belongs to MJ+(p), when the gains are discounted using the returns on arbitrary
strategies with long positions in the assets. Also as a special case, gain process
vectors with only one nonzero component belong to the set MJ+(p) under very mild
conditions (they correspond to a bubble in only one of the assets). Therefore MJ+(p)
is a large set. For any ε ∈MJ(p), the set of portfolios “spanning” ε is denoted by
Λ(ε, p) :=
{
Λ ∈ XJ×J | ∀t ≥ 0, εt = ptΛt, εt+1 = (pt+1 + dt+1)Λt, det(I + Λt) 6= 0
}
.
We prove first that agents’ feasible consumption paths remain unchanged when prices
are inflated by a bubble in MJ+(p), if the debt limits are tightened appropriately.
Proposition 2.1. Consider an agent i starting period t with wealth equal to νt (Ft-
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measurable). Then for any θ¯−1 : Ω→ RJ which is Ft-measurable and any ε ∈MJ+(p),
(ci, θi) ∈ Bit
(
νt, w
i, p, d
)⇐⇒ (ci, θˆi) ∈ Bit (νt + εtθ¯−1, wi + εθ¯−1, p+ ε, d) ,
where θˆis = (I + Λs)
−1 (θis + Λsθ¯−1) for every s ≥ t, and Λ ∈ Λ(ε, p).
Proof. By Lemma A.1, εs = psΛs, for all s ≥ t. It follows that
νt + εtθ¯−1 − (pt + εt)θˆit = νt + εtθ¯−1 − ptθit − ptΛtθ¯−1 = νt − ptθit
and for s ≥ t+ 1, (ps + εs)θˆis = ps(θis + Λsθ¯−1) = psθis + εsθ¯−1 and
(ps + ds + εs)θˆ
i
s−1 = (ps + ds)(θ
i
s−1 + Λs−1θ¯−1) = (ps + ds)θ
i
s−1 + εsθ¯−1.
Therefore for s ≥ t+1, (ps+ds+εs)θˆis−1−(ps+εs)θˆis = (ps+ds)θis−1−psθis. Moreover,
(ps + ds + εs)θˆ
i
s−1 ≥ wis + εsθi−1 if and only if (ps + ds)θis−1 ≥ wis.
The intuition for the proposition is as follows. With bubble-inflated prices, the
initial owners of the asset receive a windfall in the form of higher initial wealth.
Tightening their future debt bounds by the bubble weighted by initial asset hold-
ings will force them to save the initial windfall in order to meet the more stringent
borrowing requirements, leading thus to equivalent budget constraints.
Given an equilibrium with asset prices p which do not contain bubbles, for any
process ε ∈MJ+(p), we show that there is an equivalent equilibrium with prices p+ε,
identical consumption and state price densities, and in which the debt constraints
bind in exactly the same date and states (even though they differ). Moreover ε is the
bubble component in the prices p+ε for any state price density a ∈ A(p+ε)(= A(p)),
that is ε = b(a, p+ ε), hence the new equilibrium unambiguously involves a bubble.
Theorem 2.2. Let
(
p, (wi)Ii=1, (c
i)Ii=1, (θ
i)Ii=1
)
be an equilibrium (with exogenous
debt limits) and without bubbles. Choose ε ∈ MJ+(p) and Λ ∈ Λ(ε, p). Then(
pˆ, (wˆi)Ii=1, (c
i, θˆi)Ii=1
)
is an equilibrium with (unambiguous) bubble ε, where
pˆ = p+ ε, θˆi = (I + Λ)−1
(
θi + Λθi−1
)
, wˆi = wi + εθi−1. (2.6)
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Proof. Optimality of (ci, θˆi) in the set Bi0((pˆ0 +d0)θ
i
−1, wˆ, pˆ) follows from the optimal-
ity of (ci, θi) in Bi0((p0 + d0)θ
i
−1, w, p), and the equality of these two budgets (Propo-
sition 2.1). Notice that
∑
i θˆ
i
t = (I + Λ)
−1(1 + Λ1) = 1, since
∑
i θ
i
t =
∑
i θ
i
−1 = 1.
Thus the market clearing conditions are satisfied.
Proposition 2.1 and Theorem 2.2 are valid, without changes, if agents are subject
to borrowing constraints rather than debt constraints, that is if the constraints (pt +
dt)θ
i
t−1 ≥ wit in (2.1) are replaced by ptθit ≥ wit. This follows, with the notation in
(2.6), from the identity pˆtθˆ
i
t = pt(I + Λt)(I + Λt)
−1(θit + Λtθ
i
−1) = ptθ
i
t + εtθ
i
−1, where
we used twice the equality εt = ptΛt.
The “bubble equivalence” theorem above compares equilibria with different debt
constraints. This seems artificial, if the debt limits are viewed as exogenously given.
We allow for the endogenous determination of debt constraints driven by limited
commitment/imperfect enforcement as in Alvarez and Jermann (2000), and show
that the bubble inflated debt bounds in the equivalent equilibrium are also compatible
with the endogenous mechanism determining debt limits.
Assume that at any period t, when facing prices p (and dividends d), consumer
i can choose to default on his beginning of period debt9 and leave the economy,
receiving a continuation utility after default V˜ it (p) (Ft-measurable). We allow this
continuation utility to depend on exogenous variables such as endowments and div-
idends, but we make explicit only the functional dependence on prices, which are
endogenous. Thus the default penalty for each agent i is described by a mapping
V˜ i : X1×J+ → X. Alvarez and Jermann (2000), following Kehoe and Levine (1993),
worked under the assumption that agents are banned from trading following default,
hence for each agent i,
V˜ it (p) := U
i
t (e
i). (2.7)
Alternatively, Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009), building on the work of Bulow and
Rogoff (1989), assume that agents are subject to a milder punishment than (2.7).
9This is equal to (pt + dt)θ
i
t−1 if his trading strategy is θ
i ∈ XJ×1.
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Agents can continue to lend but not to borrow following default,
V˜ it (p) := V
i
t (0, 0, p), (2.8)
where the second argument in V it (0, 0, p) is the process in X identically equal to zero.
As in Alvarez and Jermann (2000), the option to default endogenizes the debt limits
to the maximum level so that repayment is always individually rational given future
debt limits. This leads to the notion of debt limits that are not-too-tight.
Definition 2.2. Debt limits wi faced by agent i are not-too-tight (NTT) given prices
p and penalties V˜ i : X1×J+ ×X1×J+ → X if V it (wit, wi, p) = V˜ it (p),∀t.
The definition captures the idea that the bounds wi have to be “tight enough” to
prevent default, that is to be “self-enforcing” (V it (w
i
t, w
i, p) ≥ V˜ it (p)), but they should
allow for maximum credit expansion (thus one should not have V it (w
i
t, w
i, p) > V˜ it (p)
on a positive probability set). One can envision the NTT debt limits as being set by
competitive financial intermediaries, with agents unable to trade directly with each
other. The intermediaries set debt limits such that default is prevented, but credit
is not restricted unnecessarily, since competing intermediaries could relax them and
increase their profits (see A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda (2010) for such a model in
an economy with production).
We extend our definition of equilibrium to allow for the endogenous determination
of debt constraints, in the presence of an outside option to default. An Alvarez-
Jermann equilibrium (AJ-equilibrium, for short)
(
p¯, (w¯i)Ii=1, (c¯
i)Ii=1, (θ¯
i)Ii=1, (V˜
i)Ii=1
)
consists of a security price process p¯ ∈ X1×J+ , and for each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, debt
limits w¯i ∈ X, a consumption process c¯i ∈ X+, a trading strategy θ¯i ∈ XJ×1 and a
mapping V˜ i from prices and dividends into continuation utilities after default such
that
(
p¯, (w¯i)Ii=1, (c¯
i)Ii=1, (θ¯
i)Ii=1
)
is an equilibrium (with exogenous debt limits), and
w¯i are not-too-tight given penalties V˜ i(p¯) for default.
Existence of AJ-equilibria is a delicate problem, due to the presence of incom-
plete markets, real (long-lived) securities and infinite horizon, which creates existence
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problems even for equilibria with exogenous debt limits as in definition 2.1.10 When
markets are complete and the punishment for default is given by (2.7), the existence
of the AJ-equilibrium is established by Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and
Jermann (2000). With incomplete markets, Hernandez and Santos (1996) show that
in our environment, an equilibrium with exogenous debt limits exists for a dense
subset of endowment and dividend processes, if agents are “sufficiently impatient”
(see footnote 1), have a nonnegative initial holding of securities, and if their debt is
restricted by the present value of future endowments,11
wit = − inf
a∈A++(p)
Et
∑
s≥t
as
at
eis. (2.9)
The debt limits in (2.9) are chosen equal to the maximum amount that an agent
can borrow, if he must hold nonnegative wealth after some finite date. With com-
plete markets, they are the NTT debt limits when the punishment for default is the
confiscation of endowment, as it can be seen immediately.
An equilibrium
(
p, (wi)Ii=1, (c
i)Ii=1, (θ
i)Ii=1
)
with exogenous debt limits, can be
transformed into an AJ-equilibrium by appropriately choosing the continuation util-
ities. Indeed,
(
p, (wi)Ii=1, (c
i)Ii=1, (θ
i)Ii=1, (V˜
i)Ii=1
)
with V˜ it (p) := V
i
t (w
i
t, w
i, p) is triv-
ially an AJ-equilibrium (if the indirect utility V it (w
i
t, w
i, p) is well defined). Similarly,
by setting V˜ it := U
i
t (c
i) and w¯it := (pt+dt)θ
i
t−1, the initial equilibrium with exogenous
debt bounds becomes an AJ-equilibrium.
10The dependence of the rank of the matrix of returns (at each date and state) on asset prices
can create discontinuities in demand and lead to existence failures (for a two period environment
where an equilibrium does not exist, due to the “drop in rank” problem, see Hart 1975).
11Hernandez and Santos (1996) actually work with borrowing constraints that limit end of period
wealth, that is an agent’s i trading strategy θi must satisfy
ptθ
i
t ≥ − inf
a∈A++(p)
Et
∑
s≥t+1
as
at
eis,
when faced with prices p. Florenzano and Gourdel (1993) show that agents subject to these bor-
rowing constraints have identical budget constraints to the situation where they are subjected to
debt constraints (pt+dt)θ
i
t−1 ≥ wit that limit the beginning of period wealth, with wi given by (2.9).
Therefore all the results of Hernandez and Santos (1996) apply to the corresponding environment
with debt constraints (2.9).
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We show next that bubble injections as in Theorem 2.2 preserve the NTT condi-
tion on debt limits, under a mild assumption on the form of penalties for default.
Theorem 2.3. Let
(
p, (wi)Ii=1, (c
i)Ii=1, (θ
i)Ii=1, (V˜
i)Ii=1
)
be an AJ-equilibrium. Choose
ε ∈ MJ+(p) and Λ ∈ Λ(ε, p). If V˜ i(p + ε) = V˜ i(p) for all agents i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, then(
pˆ, (wˆi)Ii=1, (c
i, θˆi)Ii=1, (V˜
i)Ii=1
)
is an AJ-equilibrium, with pˆ, θˆi, wˆi given by (2.6).
Proof. By Proposition 2.1, wˆi := wi + εθi−1 are not-too-tight for prices pˆ, since
V˜ it (pˆ) = V˜
i
t (p) = V
i
t (w
i
t, w
i, p) = V it (w
i
t + εtθ
i
−1, w
i + εθi−1, p+ ε) = V
i
t (wˆ
i
t, wˆ
i, pˆ).
The conclusion follows from Theorem 2.2.
Condition V˜ i(p+ε) = V˜ i(p) holds when the continuation utilities after default are
of the form (2.7) since in this case V˜ i does not depend on prices. It holds also for the
penalties (2.8). In fact, assume more generally that after default agent i is subjected
to some exogenous debt limits w˜i (equal to zero for the case in (2.8)). By Proposition
2.1, with νt := w˜
i
t, θ−1 := 0 ∈ RJ and wi := 0, V it (w˜it+εt ·0, w˜i, p+ε) = V it (w˜it, w˜i, p),
and therefore
V˜ it (p+ ε) = V
i
t (w˜
i
t, w˜
i, p+ ε) = V it (w˜
i
t, w˜
i, p) = V˜ it (p). (2.10)
In order for the modified debt limits (wˆi) of the bubble-equivalent equilibrium of
Theorem 2.3 to remain nonpositive (assuming that the initial constraints (wi) were
nonpositive), it must be the case that the present value of the aggregate consump-
tion is infinite under at least one pricing kernel. This follows by adapting Santos
and Woodford’s (1997) results to our framework with debt constraints rather than
borrowing constraints (Bidian 2011, Chapter 2). Infinite present value of consump-
tion caused by low interest rates is the natural result of the existence of enforcement
limitations, since in equilibrium interest rates adjust to a lower level to induce agents
to repay their debt and prevent default.
In fact, when the default punishment is the interdiction to borrow and markets
are complete, Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) show that the discounted (that is, multi-
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plied by the pricing kernel) debt limits are martingales, and that the present value of
aggregate consumption must be infinite. Moreover, Bidian and Bejan (2012) prove
that bubble injections leading to nonpositive debt limits are possible for much more
general penalties for default, where agents are allowed to borrow arbitrary fractions
(possible zero) of their endowments upon default. They also show that bubbles can
also be sustained in equilibrium under a permanent interdiction to trade (Kehoe and
Levine 1993, Alvarez and Jermann 2000), or just a one-period interdiction to trade.
However, an interdiction to trade as punishment for default does not preclude equi-
libria with high interest rates, where bubble injections with nonpositive debt limits
cannot exist. In fact, these were the equilibria that the previous literature almost
exclusively focused on (Kehoe and Levine 1993, Kehoe and Levine 2001, Alvarez and
Jermann 2000, Krueger and Perri 2006, etc). The exceptions are Antinolfi, Azariadis,
and Bullard (2007) and Bloise, Reichlin, and Tirelli (2009).
While the injection of the bubble leaves agents’ consumption unchanged, it affects
asset prices and returns, and the volume of trade. Therefore bubbles can reconcile the
high volatility of prices relative to consumption and dividends (the “excess volatility
puzzle”) and can induce high risk premia and high and time varying Sharpe ratios
(the unconditional/conditional “equity premium puzzle”). The injection of a bubble
can generate large increases in the volume of trade, feat that rational bubbles were
thought unable to accomplish, as explained in the introduction. These ideas are
pursued next.
3 Effects of bubbles on returns and trade volume
We investigate the effect of a bubble injection on returns and trade volumes. We
compare the two “equivalent” equilibria of Theorem 2.2, the bubble-free equilibrium(
p, (wi)Ii=1, (c
i)Ii=1, (θ
i)Ii=1
)
and the bubbly equilibrium
(
pˆ, (wˆi)Ii=1, (c
i, θˆi)Ii=1
)
. For
concreteness, we focus on the case when a bubble is introduced in the first asset,
that is ε = (ε1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ X1×J+ . The period t + 1 gross returns on the first asset
in the two equilibria are R1t+1 := (p
1
t+1 + d
1
t+1)/p
1
t , Rˆ
1
t+1 := (pˆ
1
t+1 + d
1
t+1)/pˆ
1
t . Since
pˆ1 = p1 + ε1, the return in the bubbly equilibrium is a convex combination of the
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initial return and the rate of growth of the bubble,
Rˆ1t+1 =
p1t
pˆ1t
R1t+1 +
(
1− p
1
t
pˆ1t
)
ε1t+1
ε1t
. (3.1)
We show that a bubble injection on an asset increases its risk premium, respec-
tively Sharpe ratio, if the bubble growth rate has a higher risk premium, respectively
higher Sharpe ratio. If Z1, Z2 are Ft+1-measurable, Covt(Z1, Z2) and ρt(Z1, Z2) are
their conditional covariance and conditional correlation given Ft, while σt(Z1) is the
conditional standard deviation of Z1 given Ft.
Proposition 3.1. Let a ∈ A++(p) and let mt+1 := at+1/at be the associated stochas-
tic discount factor and Rft+1 := 1/Etmt+1 the risk free rate. The following hold:
(i)
EtRˆ
1
t+1 −Rft+1 ≥ EtR1t+1 −Rft+1 (≥ 0)⇔ Et
ε1t+1
ε1t
−Rft+1 ≥ EtR1t+1 −Rft+1 (≥ 0)
⇔ Covt
(
mt+1,
ε1t+1
ε1t
)
≤ Covt(mt+1, R1t+1) (≤ 0).
(ii)
Et
ε1t+1
ε1t
−Rft+1
σt
(
ε1t+1
ε1t
) ≥ EtR1t+1 −Rft+1
σt(R1t+1)
≥ 0⇔ ρt
(
mt+1,
ε1t+1
ε1t
)
≤ ρt(mt+1, Rt+1) ≤ 0⇒
⇒ EtRˆ
1
t+1 −Rft+1
σt(Rˆ1t+1)
≥ EtR
1
t+1 −Rft+1
σt(R1t+1)
≥ 0.
Proof. For an arbitrary return Rt+1 and in particular for the bubble growth rate
ε1t+1/ε
1
t , the (conditional) risk premium and Sharpe ratio satisfy
Et(Rt+1 −Rft+1) = −Rft+1Covt(mt+1, Rt+1), (3.2)
EtRt+1 −Rft+1
σt(Rt+1)
=
−Rft+1Covt(mt+1, Rt+1)
σt(Rt+1)
= −Rft+1σt(mt+1) · ρt(mt+1, Rt+1). (3.3)
17
The first part now follows from (3.1), while the second part follows from
σt(Rˆ
1
t+1) ≤
p1t
pˆ1t
σt(R
1
t+1) +
(
1− p
1
t
pˆ1t
)
σt
(
ε1t+1
ε1t
)
.
We proved that a bubble injected in an asset increases the conditional expected
return, respectively conditional Sharpe ratio of the asset if the rate of growth of
the bubble covaries, respectively is correlated more negatively to fundamentals (the
stochastic discount factor) than the initial asset return. Such bubbles can help
explain the equity premium puzzle, as they increase the Sharpe ratios without af-
fecting agents’ consumption. By (3.1) and (3.3), the conditional Sharpe ratio of
the bubble-inflated asset varies over time even when the conditional expectations
EtRt+1, Etε
1
t+1/εt and conditional volatilities σtRt+1, σt
(
ε1t+1/εt
)
of the initial return
and bubble rate of growth are constant, as the “weight” pt/pˆt of the initial return in
the bubbly return varies with the size of the bubble. This variability of the Sharpe
ratio over time without an accompanying variability of the volatility of consumption
represents a resolution to the conditional equity premium puzzle (Cochrane 2000,
Chapter 21). As bubble injections distort prices and can increase their volatility,
without affecting fundamentals, they also provide a natural explanation for the ex-
cess volatility puzzle (Shiller 1981). Indeed,
σ2t (pˆt+1)
σ2t (pt+1)
= 1 +
σt(εt+1)
σt(pt+1)
(
σt(εt+1)
σt(pt+1)
+ 2ρt(εt+1, pt+1)
)
,
and therefore the (conditional) volatility of prices increases whenever the (condi-
tional) volatility of the bubble is high enough (it is sufficient to be twice as high
as volatility of prices), or if the correlation between the bubble and prices is high
enough (it is sufficient to be positive).
We focus next on the volume of trade effects of bubble injections. As mentioned in
the introduction, bubbles in an asset are typically associated with large increases in
the volume of trading in that asset (Cochrane 2002). In the bubble-free equilibrium,
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the number of shares of each asset bought, respectively sold, by agent i at t is
(θit − θit−1)+, respectively (θit − θit−1)− (the positive part and the negative part of the
change in portfolio are applied component-wise). Notice that the total number of
shares of each asset bought and sold at t are equal, since
∑
i
(θit − θit−1)+ =
∑
i
(θit − θit−1)− =
1
2
∑
i
|θit − θit−1|.
Thus we can measure the share volume of trade at t in each asset as
SVt = (SV
1
t , . . . , SV
J
t )
′ :=
1
2
∑
i
|θit − θit−1|, (3.4)
and the dollar volume of trade for asset j as DV jt := p
j
tSV
j
t . The share and dollar
volume of trade in the bubbly equilibrium are SˆV t :=
1
2
∑
i |θˆit − θˆit−1|, DˆV
j
t :=
(pjt + ε
j
t)SˆV
j
t ,∀j, where θˆit = (I + Λt)−1(θit + Λtθi−1), for all t ≥ −1 and Λ ∈ Λ(ε, p).
When ε = (ε1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ X1×J+ , then Λ = (Λ1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Λ(ε, p) ⊂ XJ×J , and
θˆit =
(
I− Λt
1 + Λ11t
)
(θit + Λtθ
i
−1) =
(
I− Λt
1 + Λ11t
)
θit +
Λt
1 + Λ11t
θi−1. (3.5)
It is difficult to study the volume of trade effects of bubbles at this level of general-
ity. We focus therefore on examples having several features that make the problem
tractable. The examples have only two agents. Hence the portfolio of one agent
determines fully the volume of trade in each security. In other words, for each agent
i ∈ {1, 2} and security j, SV jt = |θi,jt − θi,jt−1| and SˆV
j
t = |θˆi,jt − θˆi,jt−1|. Furthermore,
we assume that there are only two assets, and (3.5) becomes
θˆi,1t =
θi,1t − θi−1
1 + Λ11t
+ θi−1; θˆ
i,2
t = −
Λ21t
1 + Λ11t
θi,1t + θ
i,2
t . (3.6)
We focus first on a complete markets economy where the penalty for default is the
interdiction to trade (2.7), and then on an incomplete markets economy with an
interdiction to borrow (2.8) as penalty for default.
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3.1 Example: complete markets
The uncertainty is described by a time homogeneous Markov process (st)t∈N with
states st ∈ {1, 2}, and with a probability of reversal equal to pi ∈ (0, 1]. Thus for any
t, st+1 6= st with probability pi. The case pi = 1 generates a deterministic economy.
There are two agents {1, 2} with identical utilities U(c) = E∑t≥0 βtu(ct), where u is
strictly increasing and concave. At each period t, agent i receives an income eit := y
H
if st = i and e
i
t := y
L otherwise, with yH > yL. At any period, the agent with income
yH is referred to as high-type, and the agent with income yL is the low-type. The
penalty for default is the interdiction to trade (2.7).
When agents can trade in one period Arrow securities in zero supply, the sta-
tionary equilibria in this framework were studied by Kehoe and Levine (2001) and
Alvarez and Jermann (2001). We present these equilibria, support them with in-
finitely lived assets that dynamically complete the markets rather than with Arrow
securities, and then analyze the effect of bubble injections on the volume of trade.
There exists a unique stationary equilibrium. For the high (low) type agent,
consumption is cH (cL), wealth level (beginning of each period) is −w (w), and the
unique pricing kernel a is such that at+1
at
= qc if st 6= st+1 and at+1at = qnc if st = st+1.
Moreover, if the initial levels of wealth do not coincide with the steady state levels,
in particular if agents start with no wealth, as we will assume, the transition to the
steady state is complete at the first state reversal. During the transition, the agents’
consumption is constant, but different from the steady state levels. Steady state
consumptions satisfy the market clearing condition cL + cH = yL + yH , and the high
type agent is indifferent between defaulting or not, which gives
(1− β(1− pi))u(cH) + βpiu(cL)
(1− β)(1− β + 2piβ) =
(1− β(1− pi))u(yH) + βpiu(yL)
(1− β)(1− β + 2piβ) . (3.7)
The pricing kernel follows from the Euler conditions of an (unconstrained) high-type,
qnc = β, qc = βu
′(cL)/u′(cH). (3.8)
Let q¯c := piqc and q¯nc := (1 − pi)qnc. The beginning of period wealth level for the
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low-type agent is
w = (yH − cH)/(1 + q¯c − q¯nc), (3.9)
(and for a high-type is −w), while the NTT debt limits for a high-type agent are
φH := −w and for a low-type agent are φL := −q¯cw/(1− q¯nc). As shown in Alvarez
and Jermann (2001), the quantities and prices outlined above are an equilibrium
(with imperfect risk sharing) if and only if yL < cL < cH < yH . Notice that (3.7)
amounts to u(cH)+ β˜u(cL) = u(yH)+ β˜u(yL), where β˜ = βpi
1−β(1−pi) . Bidian and Bejan
(2012) show that yL < cL and cH < yH if and only if β˜u′(yL)/u′(yH) > 1, and if this
assumption holds, then cL < cH if and only if
(1 + β˜)u
(
yH + yL
2
)
≤ u(yH) + β˜u(yL). (3.10)
Condition (3.10) can be understood as requiring that the first best symmetric alloca-
tion in which each agent consumes half of the aggregate endowment does not satisfy
the participation constraints of the high type agents. It can be verified immediately
that the price q¯ of a riskless asset is less than 1, q¯ := Etat+1/at = q¯c + q¯nc < 1, and
therefore interest rates are “high”.12
We substitute the Arrow securities with two infinitely lived assets, which dynam-
ically complete the markets. We analyze two types of dividend structure. In the
first case, one of the assets pays dividends contingent on a reversal having occurred,
and the other way around for the other asset. In the second case, asset j ∈ {1, 2}
pays dividends at a given period if and only if state j occurred at that period.13 We
12 For the case (2.8) where the penalty for default is the interdiction to borrow, the equilibria can
be described along the same lines. The steady state pricing kernel and consumption are determined
from (3.8), the market clearing condition cL + cH = yL + yH and the property that the risk free
rate is zero (or equivalently, q¯ = 1). Wealth for the low-type agent is given by (3.9), and for a
high-type is −w, while the NTT debt limits for both types are −w. The transition to the steady
state is completed at the first state reversal (Hellwig and Lorenzoni 2009).
13When the penalty for default is the interdiction to borrow, the interest rates are low, and
therefore the discounted present value of the infinite stream of dividends will be infinite whenever
the dividend stream is bounded from below infinitely often. We could assume stationary dividends
up to a decreasing time trend, but in this case the volume of trade needed to generate constant
wealth transfers between agents (as needed in the equilibrium described in footnote 12) explodes
to infinity (even without bubbles), as prices of the assets converge to zero at the rate of the time
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assume that agents start with no endowment of securities, hence bubble injections
will not affect agents’ debt limits (see Theorem 2.2).
3.1.1 Dividends depending on state reversal
There are two infinitely lived assets {1, 2} in zero supply with dividends d1t =
λ1st=st−1 , d
2
t = λ1st 6=st−1 for t > 0 and equal to zero at t = 0, where λ > 0 and
1 is the indicator function (for A ⊂ Ω and ω ∈ Ω, 1A(ω) is 1 if ω ∈ A and 0 if
ω /∈ A). Thus the first asset pays dividends if there is no change in state, while the
second asset pays dividends after a reversal of state. We focus on a period t ≥ 1
after the economy has reached steady state, which happens on the first state reversal.
Thus if the steady state is reached at T > 0 (which is an a.s. finite stopping time),
then any variable below with a subscript t is to be understood as referring to period
T + t. The fundamental values of the assets are
p1t = λ
∑
s>t
q¯s−t−1(q¯c · 0 + q¯nc · 1) = λq¯nc
1− q¯ , p
2
t = λ
∑
s>t
q¯s−t−1(q¯c · 1 + q¯nc · 0) = λq¯c
1− q¯ .
We replicate agents’ wealth levels with portfolios of long-lived securities, eliminating
the need for Arrow securities. Thus we construct portfolios θi for each agent such
that, given the asset prices computed before, (pt + dt)θ
i
t−1 = (−1)1st=iw. Denote
by θ¯j,t−1 the holdings of a low type at t − 1 of security j. If the state changes
from t − 1 to t, (p1t + 0)θ¯1,t−1 + (p2t + λ)θ¯2,t−1 = −w, while if there is no change,
(p1t + λ)θ¯1,t−1 + (p
2
t + 0)θ¯2,t−1 = w. Solving this system of equations, we obtain
θ¯1,t−1 = wλ−1(2q¯c + 1− q¯), θ¯2,t−1 = −wλ−1(2q¯nc + 1− q¯).
Notice that the asset prices and portfolios are time invariant after the economy
reaches the steady state, and we can omit the time subscript.
We consider bubbles ε which do not crash before the steady state is reached
(before T ), and their value at T is some positive ε¯. After the steady state is reached,
trend. This is the reason why we focused on the case where agents are not allowed to trade after
default.
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they grow at the rate εc ≥ 0 if there is a state change, respectively εnc ≥ 0 if there is
no state change, that is εt = εt−1 ·
(
εc1st 6=st−1 + εnc1st=st−1
)
. A value εc = 0 implies
that the bubble crashes on the first state change, while if εnc = 0, the bubble crashes
if the state does not change (after the steady state is reached). The bubble spanning
portfolios follow from
(p1t + 0)Λ
11
t−1 + (p
2
t + λ)Λ
21
t−1 = εt−1εc, (p
1
t + λ)Λ
11
t−1 + (p
2
t + 0)Λ
21
t−1 = εt−1εnc,
and therefore
Λ11t−1 = λ
−1(εnc − 1) · εt−1; Λ21t−1 = λ−1(εc − 1) · εt−1. (3.11)
Denote by SV jt (c), respectively SV
j
t (nc) the share volumes in asset j if state changes
(c), respectively it does not change (nc) from t − 1 to t, and similarly for dollar
volumes, and the share and dollar volumes after the bubble injection. Notice that
SV 1t (c) = 2θ¯1 > 0, SV
1
t (nc) = 0, SV
2
t (c) = −2θ¯2 > 0, SV 2t (nc) = 0 and
SˆV
1
t (c) = θ¯1
∣∣∣∣ 11 + Λ11t−1 + 11 + Λ11t
∣∣∣∣ , SˆV 1t (nc) = θ¯1 ∣∣∣∣ 11 + Λ11t−1 − 11 + Λ11t
∣∣∣∣ ,
SˆV
2
t (c) =
∣∣∣∣−2θ¯2 + θ¯1 Λ21t−11 + Λ11t−1 + θ¯1 Λ
21
t
1 + Λ11t
∣∣∣∣ , SˆV 2t (nc) = θ¯1 ∣∣∣∣ Λ21t−11 + Λ11t−1 − Λ
21
t
1 + Λ11t
∣∣∣∣ .
Therefore a bubble injection in the first asset increases the share volume of trade
in both assets at periods when there is no reversal, since the volume of trade jumps
from zero to a positive value. If the state changes, the effect of a bubble injection
depends on the type of bubble introduced. For concreteness, in what follows we focus
on two types of bubbles: a deterministic bubble and a bubble that crashes on the
first reversal.
For a deterministic bubble, εc = εnc = q¯
−1, Λ11t−1 = Λ
21
t−1 = λ
−1(1 − q¯)q¯−tε¯. If
there is no reversal from t− 1 to t, the bubble increases the volume of trade in both
securities, as seen before. However, asymptotically these increases vanish except
for the dollar volume of trade in first asset. Indeed, for large t, since Λ11t ↗ ∞, it
follows that SˆV
1
t (nc), SˆV
2
t (nc), DˆV
2
t (nc) ≈ 0, while DˆV
1
t (nc) ≈ λθ¯1. When there is a
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reversal from t−1 to t, the share volume of trade in the first security decreases, while
it increases for the second security. The dollar volume of trade increases however
even for the first security,
DˆV
1
t (c) =
(
p1t + εt
)
SˆV
1
t (c) =
(
p1t (1 + Λ
11
t ) + p
2
tΛ
21
t
)
SˆV
1
t (c) > p
1
t · 2θ¯1 = DV 1t .
For large t, SˆV
1
t (c) ≈ 0, SˆV
2
t (c) ≈ 2θ¯1−2θ¯2, DˆV
2
t (c) ≈ 2p2(θ¯1− θ¯2), while DˆV
1
t (c) ≈
λθ¯1(1+ q¯)/(1− q¯). Thus a deterministic bubble in the first asset always increases the
dollar volumes of trade in both assets. The increase in the dollar volume of trade in
the first asset is persistent.
For a stochastic bubble that crashes on the first reversal (after the steady state
is reached), εc = 0, εnc = q¯
−1
nc , Λ
11
t−1 = λ
−1(εnc − 1)εt−1 > 0, Λ21t−1 = −λ−1εt−1.
If there is no reversal from t − 1 to t, the bubble increases the volume of trade in
both securities. If t is large, the share volume of trade in both securities is close
to zero, but the dollar volume in the first security DˆV
1
t (nc) is bounded away from
zero, as it approaches λθ¯1. If the state changes from t − 1 to t, the bubble crashes
and Λ11t = Λ
21
t = 0. Therefore the share and dollar volume of trade in the first asset
decrease in the period when the bubble crashes, as
SˆV
1
t (c) = θ¯1
(
1 +
1
1 + Λ11t−1
)
< 2θ¯1 = SV
1
t (c),
and DˆV
1
t (c) = p
1SˆV
1
t (c) < p
1SV 1t (c) = DV
1
t (c). The volume of trade in the second
security also decreases when the bubble crashes, since it can be checked that
SˆV
2
t (c) =
∣∣∣∣−2θ¯2 + θ¯1 Λ21t−11 + Λ11t−1
∣∣∣∣ < −2θ¯2 = SV 2t (c).
In summary, as long as the stochastic bubble is running, the share and dollar volume
of trade are higher than normal. The dollar volume of trade in the first security is
bounded away from zero. When the bubble collapses, the volume of trade shrinks to
levels lower than normal. After the crash, the trade volume reverts back to normal.
We calibrate the example using the parameters already employed by Alvarez
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and Jermann (2001) in their analysis of the volatility of the pricing kernel in this
model. Thus β = 0.65, yH = 0.641, yL = 0.359, pi = 0.25, and u(c) = c1−γ/(1 − γ),
with γ = 2. Finally, we take λ = 0.03 as being the average ratio of US net corporate
dividends to gross domestic product (GDP) for 1947-2011 (Federal Reserve Economic
Data). It follows that cH ≈ 0.639, cL ≈ 0.361, q¯nc ≈ 0.487, q¯c ≈ 0.507, p1 ≈ 1.772,
p2 ≈ 1.843, θ¯1 ≈ 0.124, θ¯2 ≈ −0.12. The value of the stochastic bubble when the
economy enters the steady state is assumed to be ε¯ = 0.001. We compare the dollar
trade volumes after the bubble with their levels without the bubble. The increase
in the dollar volume of trade in the first period if the bubble has not crashed yet
is 0.007 for each asset. Therefore a very small initial bubble, equal to 0.1% of
the GDP, generates an initial increase in the total trade volume of 14 times its size.
Conditional on the bubble not having crashed, the increase in trade volume continues
to grow (for 5 periods) and reaches a maximum of 7.81% of GDP, and then tapers off,
approaching 0.25% of GDP if the bubble runs for a long time. If the bubble crashes in
the first period, the drop in trade volume equals 0.55% of GDP, while if the bubble
is sustained for a long time and then crashes, the drop in trade volume is 16.2%
of GDP. In relative terms, when compared to the no-bubble case, the total trade
volume drops by 1.68% if the bubble crashes in the first period, and by 49.7% if the
bubble crashes after a long run. Thus small bubbles can produce disproportionately
large increases in the volume of trade, and subsequent large collapses in trade volume
when they crash.
3.1.2 Dividends depending on current state
Assume that the dividends of the two securities are dit = λ1st=i for t > 0, and zero at
t = 0. Thus asset j ∈ {1, 2} pays dividends λ at t if state j is realized at t, and zero
otherwise. It is immediate to see that asset prices depend only on the realization of
the current state, thus pjt = p
j(st). The fundamental valuation equation gives
p1(1) = q¯c
(
p1(2) + 0
)
+ q¯nc
(
p1(1) + λ
)
, p1(2) = q¯c
(
p1(1) + λ
)
+ q¯nc
(
p1(2) + 0
)
,
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hence
p1(1) =
1
2
· λq¯
1− q¯ +
1
2
· λ(q¯nc − q¯c)
1− (q¯nc − q¯c) , p
1(2) =
1
2
· λq¯
1− q¯ −
1
2
· λ(q¯nc − q¯c)
1− (q¯nc − q¯c) .
By symmetry, p2(1) = p1(2), p2(2) = p1(1). Let θit−1(k) denote the portfolio of agent
i at t− 1 if the state realized at t− 1 is k. It follows that
(p1(1) + λ)θ1,1t−1(1) + p
2(1)θ1,2t−1(1) = −w, p1(2)θ1,1t−1(1) + (p2(2) + λ)θ1,2t−1(1) = w,
and therefore θ1,1t−1(1) = −θ1,2t−1(1) = −w/(p1(1)− p1(2) + λ) < 0. A similar reasoning
shows that θ1,1t−1(2) = −θ1,2t−1(2) = θ1,1t−1(1). Since the steady state portfolios are time
invariant and do not depend on the state process, we can drop the time subscripts
and the state arguments. The agents hold balanced amounts of the two securities,
equal in absolute value, but of opposite sign. The share and dollar volume of trade
in both securities are zero (after the steady state is reached), SV jt = DV
j
t = 0,
j ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore an (arbitrary) bubble injection increases the share and dollar
volume of trade in all securities.
Consider first a deterministic bubble (εt) (in the first asset). The process Λ ∈
X2×1 satisfying (pt + dt)Λt−1 = εt is Λ11t−1 = Λ
21
t−1 = ε¯q¯
−t(p1(1) + p2(1) + λ)−1. The
volume of trade t periods after the economy reaches the steady state is
SˆV
1
t =
∣∣∣∣ 11 + Λ11t θ1,1 − 11 + Λ11t−1 θ1,1
∣∣∣∣ = |θ1,1t | Λ11t (1− q¯)(1 + Λ11t )(1 + q¯Λ11t ) →t→∞ 0,
SˆV
2
t =
∣∣∣∣θ1,2 − Λ21t1 + Λ11t θ1,1 − θ1,2 + Λ
21
t−1
1 + Λ11t−1
θ1,1
∣∣∣∣ = SˆV 1t →t→∞ 0,
DˆV
1
t = (p
1(st) + ε¯q¯
−t)SˆV
1
t →t→∞ |θ1,1|(1− q¯)(p1(1) + p1(2) + λ).
It follows that the market-wide increase in the share volume of trade induced by a
deterministic bubble (in the first asset) vanishes asymptotically, while the increase
in the dollar volume of trade in the first asset is persistent.
The effects of a stochastic bubble can be analyzed in a similar fashion. Consider
(as in Section 3.1.1) a bubble in the first asset that crashes on the first reversal (after
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the steady state is reached). For concreteness, assume that the economy starts in
state 2 and therefore the steady state is reached when the state switches to 1 for the
first time. Thus εc = 0, εnc = q¯
−1
nc . The bubble spanning portfolios satisfy
(p1(1) + λ)Λ11t−1 + p
2(1)Λ21t−1 = εncεt−1, p
1(2)Λ11t−1 + (p
2(2) + λ)Λ21t−1 = 0,
and therefore
Λ11t−1 =
εt−1q¯−1nc (p
1(1) + λ)
(p1(1) + λ)2 − (p1(2))2 , Λ
21
t−1 = −
εt−1q¯−1nc p
1(2)
(p1(1) + λ)2 − (p1(2))2 .
It can be checked immediately that Λ11t−1 is positive and grows at the rate q¯
−1
nc > 1
as long as the bubble does not crash. As was the case for the deterministic bubble,
the share volume of trade in both securities approaches zero if the bubble runs for
a long time, but the dollar volume of trade in the first asset is bounded away from
zero, and approaches |θ1,1|(1− q¯nc)((p1(1) + λ)2 − (p1(2))2)/(p1(1) + λ).
With the numerical calibration of the previous section, p1(1) ≈ 2.711, p1(2) ≈
2.712, θ1,1 ≈ −0.083. A stochastic bubble (crashing on the first reversal) of size 0.1%
of the GDP at the period when the economy reaches the steady state increases the
total trade volume by 1.5% of GDP in the first period. The trade volume increase
continues to grow initially, reaching a maximum of 7.97% of GDP after 5 periods,
and then starts to drop, but nevertheless the increase is persistent and approaches
0.25% of GDP if the bubble runs for a long time.
We wrap up the example of Section 3.1 by discussing the effect of bubble injec-
tions on risk premia and Sharpe ratios. This can be done without making specific
assumptions on dividends. Since at any period there are only two possible states in
the next period, it follows that conditional on current information, the period ahead
stochastic discount factor (SDF) is fully correlated (either positively or negatively)
with any nondeterministic bubble or with some risky return. Assume that the first
asset has a positive risk premium, hence it has a (conditional) correlation of −1 with
the SDF. By Proposition 3.1, the positive risk premium of the (first) asset can be
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increased by a bubble injection if and only if the volatility of the bubble growth
rate exceeds the volatility of the return, σt (εt+1/εt) > σt(R
1
t+1).
14 The Sharpe ratio
cannot increase however, since the growth rate of any bubble cannot have a lower
correlation to the SDF (see Proposition 3.1). The two-state Markov process under-
lying uncertainty cannot generate rich enough correlations between returns/bubbles
and the SDF to produce interesting effects of bubbles on Sharpe ratios. Kurtosis
of returns is unaffected by bubbles due to the same reason, thus bubbles cannot
generate fat tails in this example.
3.2 Example: incomplete markets
The uncertainty is described by a time homogeneous Markov process (st)t∈N with
st ∈ {1, 2, 3}, having a transition probability matrix pi with strictly positive entries.
There are two agents {1, 2} with utilities U i(c) = E∑t≥0 βtu(ct), where u is strictly
increasing and strictly concave. There are two assets in unit supply. In each period,
the first asset pays y > 0 if the current state is 1, y/2 in state 2, and 0 in state 3. The
second asset pays 0 in state 1, y/2 in state 2, and y in state 3. We assume we have
a security markets economy, in that agents’ only income is generated by dividends
resulting from their asset holdings. Agent i ∈ {1, 2} has an initial endowment of
security i equal to 1, and a zero endowment of the other security. The agents face zero
debt limits, which of course are NTT when the penalty for default is the interdiction
to borrow (2.8). Since agents’ wealth originates solely from financial wealth, these
debt limits are also given by (2.9), where debt is restricted by the present value of
future endowments.
We construct a Pareto optimal equilibrium in which expected (gross) returns are
equal to β−1 and agents have constant consumption. Thus the securities are fairly
priced in that their price equals the expected value of dividends discounted at the risk
free rate β−1. There will be no trade after the initial period, when the portfolios are
adjusted once and for all. This is not surprising as markets are effectively complete
14For example, it can be checked that the stochastic bubble of Section 3.1.1 satisfies this condition
if and only if β > (1− q¯)/(1− q¯nc).
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(Leroy and Werner 2001),15 and Judd, Kubler, and Schmedders (2003) show that no
trade obtains generically with complete markets in this type of Markov environment.
Asset prices are the present value of future dividends,
pjt = Et
∑
s>t
βs−tdjs, ∀j ∈ {1, 2},∀t ≥ 0. (3.12)
Beginning of period wealth levels are obtained from the intertemporal budgets,
(pt + dt)θ
i
t−1 = Et
∞∑
s≥t
βs−tci =
ci
1− β , ∀i ∈ {1, 2},∀t ≥ 0. (3.13)
By writing (3.13) at t = 0 we obtain the (constant) consumption levels,
ci = (1− β)(pi0 + di0) = (1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt · Edit, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. (3.14)
Notice that p1t + p
2
t = βy/(1 − β) and p1t + d1t + p2t + d2t = y/(1 − β). Therefore,
generically in pi, (3.13) admits only the solution
θi,1t = θ
i,2
t =
ci
y
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2},∀t ≥ 0. (3.15)
To check that the allocations, portfolios and prices described in (3.12)-(3.15) form an
equilibrium, it is enough to prove that the consumptions and portfolios are optimal
for each agent, as the market clearing conditions are clearly satisfied. But this is
true, since the given consumptions and portfolios satisfy the necessary and sufficient
Kuhn-Tucker and transversality conditions for agents’ utility maximization problems
(Forno and Montrucchio 2003, Th. 3.6 and Prop. 3.9):
pt = Et
βu′(ci)
u′(ci)
(pt+1 + dt+1),∀t ≥ 0, and lim
t→∞
Eβtu′(ci)ptθit = 0.
15The aggregate endowment is constant and in all Pareto optimal allocations agents receive a
constant consumption stream, which can be replicated by (balanced) portfolios with equal amounts
of the two assets.
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Given the zero volume of trade following the initial period, arbitrary bubble
injections increase the share and dollar volume of trade.16 To analyze further the
volume of trade effects, we focus for concreteness on a deterministic bubble with an
initial value ε¯, injected in the first asset. Thus εt = β
−tε¯. The bubble spanning
portfolios are generically (in pi) unique and given by
Λ11t−1 = Λ
21
t−1 = ε¯β
−ty−1(1− β). (3.16)
By (3.6) and (3.15) the share volume of trade in both assets increases, but this
increase vanishes asymptotically, as − Λ21t
1+Λ11t
= 1
1+Λ11t
− 1 and
SˆV
1
t = |θˆi,1t − θˆi,1t−1| =
∣∣∣∣∣θi,1t − θi,1−11 + Λ11t − θ
i,1
t−1 − θi,1−1
1 + Λ11t−1
∣∣∣∣∣ = θ2,1t (1− β)Λ11t(1 + Λ11t )(1 + βΛ11t ) →t→∞ 0,
SˆV
2
t = |θˆi,2t − θˆi,2t−1| =
∣∣∣∣( 11 + Λ11t − 1
)
θi,1t −
(
1
1 + Λ11t−1
− 1
)
θi,1t−1
∣∣∣∣ = SˆV 1t →t→∞ 0.
However the increase in the dollar volume of trade in the first asset is persistent, as
DˆV
1
t = (p
1
t + εt)SˆV
1
t → lim ε¯β−tSˆV
1
t = c
2.
4 Conclusion
We showed that any nonnegative process which does not change the set of pricing
kernels can be introduced as a bubble in asset prices, leading to an equivalent equi-
librium with identical consumption for the agents, but tighter debt limits. Moreover,
with enforcement limitations, if the debt bounds are endogenized as in Alvarez and
Jermann (2000) to prevent default but to allow for maximal credit expansion, the
modified debt limits in the equilibrium with bubbles still arise endogenously from
the existing enforcement limitations. If the underlying creditworthiness of the agents
16However, due to constant expected returns, the expected rate of growth of bubble coincides
with the expected return on any asset, hence the equity premium is unaffected by the presence of
bubbles, and remains zero.
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is unchanged but nevertheless a credit tightening occurs, bubbles help agents keep
their consumption at the same level as before the credit crunch.
Therefore, with enforcement limitations, rational bubbles are robust. They can
cause large increases in the volume of trade while they run and large collapses upon
their crash, compared to trade volumes in the absence of bubbles. The bubbles con-
structed here affect prices and returns, without affecting consumption. By creating
a disconnect between the financial and the real side of the economy, they are ideally
suited to resolve long-standing asset pricing puzzles: the excess volatility puzzle, and
the conditional/unconditional equity premium puzzle.
A Span-preserving martingales
We characterize the set of span-preserving martingales MJ(p).
Lemma A.1. Let p, d ∈ X1×J+ such that A++(p) 6= ∅ and ε ∈ X1×J . The following
are equivalent:
(i) There exists Λ ∈ XJ×J such that εt = (pt + dt)Λt−1 for all t ≥ 1 and there
exists a ∈ A++(p) such that a · ε is a martingale.
(ii) There exists Λ ∈ XJ×J such that εt = (pt + dt)Λt−1 for all t ≥ 1 and εt = ptΛt,
for all t ≥ 0.
(iii) A(p) ⊂ A(p+ ε)
(iv) For each a ∈ A(p), a · ε is a martingale.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) The conclusion is immediate, since for all t ≥ 0,
εt = Et
at+1
at
εt+1 = Et
at+1
at
(pt+1 + dt+1)Λt = ptΛt.
(ii) ⇒ (iii) Let a ∈ A(p). The conclusion follows, since
Et
at+1
at
(pt+1 + dt+1 + εt+1) = Et
at+1
at
(pt+1 + dt+1)(I + Λt) = pt(I + Λt) = pt + εt.
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(iii) ⇒ (iv) Let a ∈ A(p). Thus a ∈ A(p+ ε). It follows that for all t ≥ 0,
pt + Et
at+1
at
εt+1
a∈A(p)
= Et
at+1
at
(pt+1 + dt+1 + εt+1)
a∈A(p+ε)
= pt + εt,
and thus εt = Et
at+1
at
εt+1.
(iv)⇒ (i) Assume that m ∈ X is such that a·m is a martingale, for any a ∈ A(p).
Pick an arbitrary date t event Ft(ω) with ω ∈ Ω, with Ft(ω) representing the cell of
the partition Ft containing ω) (in other words pick a date t node in the uncertainty
tree). Assume that there Ft+1 has S subsets of Ft(ω) (i.e. there are S branches
leaving the fixed node). Then the returns rt+1 conditional on the event Ft(ω) can be
viewed as an S×J matrix R. Similarly mt+1/mt conditional on Ft(ω) is represented
by a vector M ∈ RS. If µ ∈ RS is interpreted as conditional state price process
at+1/at times conditional probabilities, it follows that for any µ ∈ RS such that
1′ = µ′R, it must be the case that 1 = µ′M . Therefore there cannot exist µ ∈ RS
such that {
µ′(R1 −M) < 0
µ′(R1 −Rj) = 0, j ∈ {2, . . . , J}.
By Motzkin’s alternative theorem (Motzkin 1951), there exist α2, . . . , αJ ∈ R such
that R1 −M = ∑Jj=2 αj(R1 − RJ). Therefore M can be written as a linear combi-
nation of the columns of R and there exists λ ∈ XJ×1 such that mt = (pt + dt)λt−1,
for all t ≥ 1.
Each component εj of ε = (ε1, . . . , εJ) is a martingale when deflated by any a ∈
A(p). As proven above, for each j there exists λj ∈ XJ×1 such that εjt = (pt+dt)λjt−1
for all t ≥ 1. The conclusion follows by setting Λ = (λ1, . . . , λJ).
For each t ≥ 1, let St(p) be the set of attainable payoffs at t given the price and
dividend processes p, d ∈ X1×J+ :
St(p) := {(pt + dt)λ | λ : Ω→ RJ and λ is Ft−1 −measurable}. (A.1)
We refer to St(p) as the period t asset span. We say that there are no redundant secu-
rities at t−1, given prices p, if there is no λ : Ω→ RJ such that λ is Ft−1−measurable,
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λ 6= 0 and (pt + dt)λ = 0. We justify now the name “span-preserving martingales”
for the set MJ(p) by showing that elements of this set are martingales when deflated
by pricing kernels and that they do not affect the pricing kernels if added to asset
prices, or equivalently, they do not change the asset span.
Proposition A.2. Assume that there are no redundant securities at any period t.
The following are equivalent:
(i) ε ∈MJ(p).
(ii) A(p) = A(p+ ε).
(iii) St(p) = St(p+ ε),∀t ∈ N and a · ε is a martingale, for some a ∈ A(p).
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) Notice that Lemma A.1 implies that A(p) ⊂ A(p + ε). Choose
a ∈ A(p+ ε). Then for any t ≥ 0,
Et
at+1
at
(pt+1 + dt+1) = Et
at+1
at
(pt+1 + dt+1 + εt+1)(I + Λt)
−1 = (pt + εt)(I + Λt)−1
= (pt + ptΛt)(I + Λt)
−1 = pt(I + Λt)(I + Λt)−1 = pt.
(ii) ⇒ (iii) By Lemmma A.1, A(p) ⊂ A(p + ε) implies the existence of Λ such
that εt = (pt + dt)Λt−1, for all t > 0. Moreover, I + Λt−1 is non-singular. Indeed,
as A(p + ε) ⊂ A(p + ε + (−ε)), there exists Γ such that εt = (pt + dt)Γt−1, and it
follows that (I + Λt−1)(I−Γt−1) = I, hence I + Λt−1 is indeed non-singular. To show
that St(p+ ε) ⊂ St(p), notice that for any λt−1 : Ω→ RJ which is Ft−1-measurable,
(pt + dt + εt)λt−1 = (pt + dt)(I + Λt−1)λt−1 ∈ St(p). The inclusion St(p) ⊂ St(p+ ε)
also holds, since for any λt−1 : Ω→ RJ that is Ft−1-measurable,
(pt + dt)λt−1 = (pt + dt + εt)(I + Λt−1)−1λt−1 ∈ St(p+ ε).
(iii)⇒ (i) We show first that the inclusion St(p+ε) ⊂ St(p) implies the existence
of Λt−1 : Ω→ RJ×J such that εt = (pt + dt)Λt−1 for all t > 0. Indeed, for any λt−1 :
Ω→ RJ which is Ft−1-measurable, there exists λ′t−1 : Ω→ RJ , Ft−1-measurable, such
that (pt + dt + εt)λt−1 = (pt + dt)λ′t−1. It follows that εtλt−1 = (pt + dt)(λ
′
t−1− λt−1),
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and since λt−1 was arbitrary, we conclude that each of the J components of εt belongs
to St(p). Thus εt = (pt + dt)Λt−1 for some Ft−1-measurable Λt−1 : Ω→ RJ×J .
From the inclusion St(p) = St(p+ ε+ (−ε)) ⊂ St(p+ ε), by the above reasoning,
there exists Γt−1 : Ω→ RJ×J which is Ft−1-measurable and such that εt = (pt + dt +
εt)Γt−1. Therefore
εt(I− Γt−1) = (pt + dt)Γt−1 = (pt + dt) (Λt−1(I− Γt−1)− Γt−1) = 0.
Since there are no redundant securities, we conclude that Λt−1(I− Γt−1)− Γt−1 = 0,
which is equivalent to (I + Λt−1)(I − Γt−1) = I, hence I + Λt−1 is non-singular.
Therefore εt = Et
at+1
at
εt+1 = Et
at+1
at
(pt+1 + dt+1)Λt = ptΛt and ε ∈MJ(p).
B Gain processes as span-preserving martingales
We give conditions under which the gain process associated to a J-dimensional vector
of trading strategies Θ = (Θ1, . . . ,ΘJ) ∈ XJ×J belongs to MJ(p). Fix a trading
strategy θ¯ ∈ XJ×1+ having a return r¯,
r¯t+1 :=
(pt+1 + dt+1)θ¯t
ptθ¯t
, ∀t ≥ 0.
Since dividends and prices are positive, r¯ is positive. Define the discount factor
process ρ¯ induced by θ¯ as ρ¯t =
∏t
s=1 r¯
−1
s , for all t > 0. The gain process g(Θ) ∈ X1×J
associated to the trading strategy vector Θ is defined as (Leroy and Werner 2001, p.
259)
gt(Θ) := ptΘt + ρ¯
−1
t
t∑
s=1
ρ¯s ((ps + ds)Θs−1 − psΘs) ,∀t. (B.1)
Thus gjt (Θ) (= gt(Θ
j)) represents the gain realized by the trading strategy Θj from
date 0 to date t measured in units of date t consumption; it is computed as the sum
of payoffs of the strategy Θj up to date t reinvested in each period at the rate of
return generated by θ¯. In particular, when Θ := I, then g(I) represents the gain
34
process of a buy-and-hold portfolio consisting of a unit of each security,
gt(I) = pt + ρ¯
−1
t
t∑
s=1
ρ¯sds ≥ 0. (B.2)
We establish conditions under which the gain process associated to Θ belongs to
MJ(p). For all t > 0, let Λt−1 := Θt−1 + θ¯t−1λ′t−1(Θ), where
λt−1(Θ) :=
(
(pt−1θ¯t−1)−1ρ¯−1t−1
t−1∑
s=1
ρ¯s ((ps + ds)Θs−1 − psΘs)
)′
.
Lemma B.1. The following hold:
(i) a · g(Θ) is a martingale for any a ∈ A(p).
(ii) g(Θ) ∈MJ(p)⇔ det(I + Θt−1) 6= 0, 1 + λ′t−1(Θ)(I + Θt−1)−1θ¯t−1 6= 0,∀t > 0.
(iii) If Θ = I, then g(Θ) ∈MJ+(p).
(iv) If Θ = (Θ1, 0, . . . , 0), then g(Θ) ∈MJ(p)⇔ 1 + Θ11 6= 0, 1 + θ¯1
1+Θ11
6= 0.
Proof. (i) For all a ∈ A(p),
Etat+1gt+1(Θ) = Etat+1pt+1Θt+1 + ρ¯t(gt(Θ)− ptΘt)Etat+1ρ¯−1t+1+
+Etat+1 ((pt+1 + dt+1)Θt − pt+1Θt+1) = ρ¯t(gt(Θ)− ptΘt)ρ¯−1t at + atptΘt = atgt(Θ).
(ii) Notice that
gt(Θ) = (pt + dt)Θt−1 + r¯tρ¯−1t−1
t−1∑
s=1
ρ¯s ((ps + ds)Θs−1 − psΘs) = (pt + dt)Λt−1.
The existence of such a Λ was guaranteed by the previous part and Lemma A.1. We
need to show that I+Λt−1 is nonsigular, under the conditions given in the proposition.
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This is indeed the case, as it can be checked that
(I + Λt−1)
−1 = (I + Θt−1)−1 − (I + Θt−1)
−1θ¯t−1λ′t−1(Θ)(I + Θt−1)
−1
1 + λ′t−1(Θ)(I + Θt−1)−1θ¯t−1
.
(iii) For Θ = I, g(Θ) ≥ 0 from (B.2). Moreover,
(I + Λt−1)
−1 =
1
2
I +
1
4
θ¯t−1λ′t−1(I)
1 + λ′t−1(I)θ¯t−1/2
,
and the conclusion follows, since 1 + λ′t−1(I)θ¯t−1/2 6= 0, taking into account that
λ′t−1(I) = (pt−1θ¯t−1)
−1ρ¯−1t−1
∑t−1
s=1 ρ¯sds ≥ 0 and θ¯ ∈ XJ×1+ . We would have arrived at
the same conclusion by computing det(I+ Λt−1), which equals 2J(1 +λ′t−1(I)θ¯t−1/2).
(iv) It is immediate to check that (I + Θt−1)−1 = I− Θt−1/(1 + Θ11t−1), and that
1 + λ′t−1(Θ)(I + Θt−1)
−1θ¯t−1 = 1 + θ¯1t−1/(1 + Θ
11
t−1). Then we use part (i).
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